People v. Reyes

Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Miller applies to mandatory term-of-years sentence, imposed for offenses committed during a single course of conduct, that cannot be served in one lifetime (here, a 97-year sentence with earliest possible release after 80 years).

Henry v. State

Florida Supreme Court held that Graham applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences, including aggregate sentences, that deprive the juvenile offender of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.

State v. Riley

Connecticut Supreme Court held that juvenile offender sentenced to 100 years in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not give “due mitigating weight” to the characteristics and circumstances of youth.

State v. Null

Juvenile offender sentenced to a mandatory 75-year sentence with no parole eligibility for 52.5 years entitled to resentencing under Miller and the Iowa Constitution.

State v. Pearson

Iowa Supreme Court remanded sentence of 50 years’ incarceration with parole eligibility after 35 years, imposed for nonhomicide crimes, for an individualized sentencing and consideration of youth in line with Miller.

McGee v. State

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary as well as mandatory life-without-parole sentences and that before sentencing a defendant to life without parole, the sentencer must determine whether the crime reflects only transient immaturity or whether this is the rare case in which the crime reflects irreparable corruption.

State v. Montgomery

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court has remanded a mandatory LWOP sentence for resentencing, stating that the resentencing court was to determine whether the defendant was “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” or whether he would be eligible for parole.

Landrum v. State

Florida Supreme Court held juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court did not consider whether the crime reflected irreparable corruption.

State v. Valencia (State v. Healer)

Arizona Supreme Court held that Miller and Montgomery entitle juvenile offender serving discretionary LWOP sentence to resentencing if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her crime did not reflect irreparably corruption but instead transient immaturity such that a natural life sentence is unconstitutional.

Veal v. State

Georgia Supreme Court concluded that juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not make a determination that he was “irreparably corrupt.”

People v. Gutierrez (People v. Moffett)

California Supreme Court has remanded cases where juvenile offenders received discretionary LWOP, explaining that, at resentencing, LWOP should not be “the presumptive sentencing choice” and that the ultimate question will be whether the defendants can be deemed irreparably corrupt notwithstanding the diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform that ordinarily distinguish juveniles from adults.

State v. Boston

Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Graham applies to lengthy, term-of-year sentences, including aggregate sentences, that are the functional equivalent of life without parole.

Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative v. Hogan

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied in part motion to dismiss action challenging constitutionality of Maryland’s parole system as applied to juvenile homicide offenders, finding that plaintiffs had “sufficiently alleged that Maryland’s parole system operates as a system of executive clemency, in which opportunities for release are ‘remote,’ rather than a true parole scheme in which opportunities for release are ‘meaningful’ and ‘realistic’ as required.

State v. Bassett

The Washington Supreme Court has held that the re-imposition of a life-without-parole sentence at a Miller resentencing proceeding, pursuant to the state’s Miller “fix” statute, violates the state’s constitutional provision against cruel punishment.

State v. Long

Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor before imposing discretionary LWOP sentence on juveniles for homicide offenses

Aiken v. Byars

South Carolina Supreme Court held that Miller applies to both mandatory and discretionary LWOP sentences and reversed and remanded 15 cases in which juvenile offenders received discretionary LWOP sentences.

State ex rel. Alden Morgan v. State

Louisiana Supreme Court held that a 99-year sentence without the possibility of parole contravened Graham’s requirement of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and is illegal (but distinguished aggregate term-of-year sentences).

Bear Cloud v. State

Juvenile offender ineligible for parole for 45 years entitled to resentencing under Miller; court must weigh the entire sentencing package in light of the mitigating factors of youth.

Hayden v. Keller

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined that a sentence of life with parole imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender violated the Eighth Amendment because North Carolina’s parole process does not provide a meaningful opportunity for release.

Greiman v. Hodges

Juvenile non-homicide offender serving life with parole after 25 years alleged that Iowa’s parole system denied him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation; defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint denied.