The Florida Supreme Court held that the application of gain time alone is insufficient to provide a defendant with a meaningful opportunity for early release within his or her natural lifetime.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is a presumption against the imposition of JLWOP, and this presumption may be overcome only if a court determines, based on competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that a juvenile is “entirely unable to change.”
The Iowa Supreme Court prohibited life-without-parole sentences for all juveniles under the state constitution.
A Michigan Court of Appeals held that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in Michigan have a Sixth Amendment right to jury findings before they may be exposed to life without parole.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court prohibited life-without-parole sentences for all juveniles under the state constitution.
Diatchenko & Roberio v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12 (2015): The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that juveniles serving life sentences are entitled to representation by counsel at their initial parole hearings, access to funding for experts, and limited judicial review of parole board decisions.
North Carolina Supreme Court held that juvenile defendant who received mandatory LWOP sentence was entitled to resentencing under Miller notwithstanding statutory entitlement to discretionary sentence review, because review process did not provide sufficiently meaningful opportunity to reduce severity of sentence.
New York appellate court held that parole boards have a constitutional obligation to consider youth and its attendant characteristics, in relationship to the crime, when making parole release decisions for juveniles sentenced to life in prison in order to guarantee a meaningful opportunity for release.
New Jersey Supreme Court held that defendants, sentenced to lengthy, aggregate term-of-year periods of incarceration for homicide and nonhomicide crimes, were entitled to resentencing because the sentences at issue were sufficiently lengthy to trigger Miller’s protections
Ohio Supreme Court determined that defendant’s 112-year aggregate sentence for nonhomicide crimes—pursuant to which he would be eligible for release after 77 years, at age 92—violated Graham’s prohibition on juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide offenders because it denied a meaningful chance to demonstrate rehabilitation and obtain release.
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Miller applies to mandatory term-of-years sentence, imposed for offenses committed during a single course of conduct, that cannot be served in one lifetime (here, a 97-year sentence with earliest possible release after 80 years).
Florida Supreme Court held that Graham applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences, including aggregate sentences, that deprive the juvenile offender of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.
Connecticut Supreme Court held that juvenile offender sentenced to 100 years in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not give “due mitigating weight” to the characteristics and circumstances of youth.
Juvenile offender sentenced to a mandatory 75-year sentence with no parole eligibility for 52.5 years entitled to resentencing under Miller and the Iowa Constitution.
Iowa Supreme Court remanded sentence of 50 years’ incarceration with parole eligibility after 35 years, imposed for nonhomicide crimes, for an individualized sentencing and consideration of youth in line with Miller.
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary as well as mandatory life-without-parole sentences and that before sentencing a defendant to life without parole, the sentencer must determine whether the crime reflects only transient immaturity or whether this is the rare case in which the crime reflects irreparable corruption.
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court has remanded a mandatory LWOP sentence for resentencing, stating that the resentencing court was to determine whether the defendant was “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” or whether he would be eligible for parole.
Florida Supreme Court held juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court did not consider whether the crime reflected irreparable corruption.
Arizona Supreme Court held that Miller and Montgomery entitle juvenile offender serving discretionary LWOP sentence to resentencing if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her crime did not reflect irreparably corruption but instead transient immaturity such that a natural life sentence is unconstitutional.