By Tessa Bialek
On October 19, 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court unanimously struck down a 99-year sentence for a nonhomicide offense as “the functional equivalent of life without parole” and illegal under Graham v. Florida. See State ex rel. Alden Morgan v. State, No. 2015-KH-0100, 2016 WL 6125428 (La. Oct. 19, 2016).
The defendant, sentenced for an armed robbery that occurred when he was 17 years old, would not have been eligible for parole until age 101. Citing Graham, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that such a sentence “does not provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” as required. It rejected the State’s attempt to distinguish between “life” versus “term-of-years” sentences, explaining that any sentence that, based on a judgment at the time of sentencing, bars a juvenile nonhomicide offender from ever re-entering society is unconstitutional under Graham. The court further noted the “paradox” in the State’s position: if the defendant’s 99-year sentence were permissible, he would remain incarcerated for life whereas others convicted of more serious offenses, who had received “life” sentences, would become parole-eligible under Louisiana’s post-Graham and Miller legislation after serving only 30 or 35 years. The court therefore construed the State’s post-Graham legislation “as applicable not just to those juvenile offenders serving a sentence of life for a nonhomicide offense, but also to those, like the defendant, serving an effective life sentence for a single nonhomicide offense which the legislature deems not so serious as to warrant an automatic life sentence.” Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court amended defendant’s sentence to delete the restriction on parole eligibility and directed the Department of Corrections to set a date for parole eligibility consideration in accordance with the applicable statute.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Crichton chastised the District Attorney for taking the “the stunning position that this defendant does not face the functional equivalent of life imprisonment and that he would have—in the year 2082 and at age 101—a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” Justice Crichton stressed that “a prosecutor’s responsibility is as ‘a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate,’” and, given his “power and responsibility, the District Attorney should seek to uphold the integrity of his office by declining to take positions that, as reflected by the 7-0 decision in this case, contravene federal constitutional law.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court joins numerous other state and federal courts in recognizing that lengthy sentences that deny a meaningful opportunity for release implicate Graham and Miller—regardless of whether the sentence is technically labeled “life without parole.” This developing consensus includes decisions from state supreme courts in California (see People v. Caballero), Connecticut (see State v. Riley; Casiano v. Commissioner); Florida (see Henry v. State; Gridline v. State; Atwell v. State), Illinois (see People v. Reyes), Indiana (see Brown v. State), Iowa (see State v. Pearson; State v. Null; State v. Ragland), Nevada (see State v. Boston), and Wyoming (see Bear Cloud v. State), as well as federal courts of appeals including the Seventh Circuit (see McKinley v. Butler) and the Ninth Circuit (see Moore v. Biter).
Tessa Bialek is a Juvenile Justice Fellow with the Juvenile Sentencing Project at Quinnipiac University School of Law.