The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption against life without parole for juvenile offenders, and that such a sentence may be imposed only if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a juvenile offender is irreparably corrupt.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a juvenile offender may be sentenced to life without parole only if the trial court determines after consideration of youth that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is a presumption against the imposition of JLWOP, and this presumption may be overcome only if a court determines, based on competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that a juvenile is “entirely unable to change.”
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary as well as mandatory life-without-parole sentences and that before sentencing a defendant to life without parole, the sentencer must determine whether the crime reflects only transient immaturity or whether this is the rare case in which the crime reflects irreparable corruption.
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court has remanded a mandatory LWOP sentence for resentencing, stating that the resentencing court was to determine whether the defendant was “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” or whether he would be eligible for parole.
Florida Supreme Court held juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court did not consider whether the crime reflected irreparable corruption.
Georgia Supreme Court concluded that juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not make a determination that he was “irreparably corrupt.”
California Supreme Court has remanded cases where juvenile offenders received discretionary LWOP, explaining that, at resentencing, LWOP should not be “the presumptive sentencing choice” and that the ultimate question will be whether the defendants can be deemed irreparably corrupt notwithstanding the diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform that ordinarily distinguish juveniles from adults.