Commonwealth v. Batts

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirmed that Miller applies to discretionary life-without-parole sentences, concluding that there is a presumption against the imposition of juvenile life without parole that may be overcome only if a court determines, based on competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that a juvenile is “entirely unable to change.”

People v. Holman

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary life-without-parole sentences, and that a juvenile offender may be sentenced to life without parole only if the trial court determines after consideration of youth that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption.

Windom v. State

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a discretionary fixed-life sentence violated Miller and Montgomery where the sentencing court heard no evidence of the mitigating factors of youth and made only brief, general reference to the defendant’s age at sentencing.

State v. Riley

Connecticut Supreme Court held that juvenile offender sentenced to 100 years in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not give “due mitigating weight” to the characteristics and circumstances of youth.

McGee v. State

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary as well as mandatory life-without-parole sentences and that before sentencing a defendant to life without parole, the sentencer must determine whether the crime reflects only transient immaturity or whether this is the rare case in which the crime reflects irreparable corruption.

Landrum v. State

Florida Supreme Court held juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court did not consider whether the crime reflected irreparable corruption.

State v. Valencia (State v. Healer)

Arizona Supreme Court held that Miller and Montgomery entitle juvenile offender serving discretionary LWOP sentence to resentencing if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her crime did not reflect irreparably corruption but instead transient immaturity such that a natural life sentence is unconstitutional.

Veal v. State

Georgia Supreme Court concluded that juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole in discretionary regime entitled to resentencing because sentencing court did not make a determination that he was “irreparably corrupt.”

State v. Long

Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor before imposing discretionary LWOP sentence on juveniles for homicide offenses

Aiken v. Byars

South Carolina Supreme Court held that Miller applies to both mandatory and discretionary LWOP sentences and reversed and remanded 15 cases in which juvenile offenders received discretionary LWOP sentences.